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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes the important
decisions rendered in 1984 by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The purpose of the review is to indicate cases of first impression and
cases that significantly affect earlier interpretations of North
Dakota law.
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Board
In Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Board Howard
Hammond appealed from a judgment by the District Court of
Burleigh County which affirmed a decision by the State Personnel
Board to terminate Hammond as chief chemist in the State
Laboratories Department. 2 On appeal the supreme court first
considered whether the State of North Dakota Personnel Policies
Manual (Manual), which had never been published in the North
Dakota Administrative Code, was binding as a part of Mr.
Hammond's employment contract. 3 Chief Justice Erickstad noted
that since the State had promulgated the Manual as part of its
personnel policy and procedure, the State must comply with the
Manual's provisions concerning termination for cause. 4 The court
concluded that the Manual required the Personnel Board to make
findings as to whether the reasons given in Hammond's
termination notice were supported by the evidence and whether the
reasons given constituted just cause.
5
Hammond specifically contended that the procedure afforded
him offended the minimum requirements of a fair hearing under
the Administrative Agencies Practices Act. 6 The court agreed,
finding that the Personel Board improperly delegated its
responsibility to a hearing examiner.7 The Personnel Board had
made it a common practice to base its decision solely upon a review
of a hearing examiner's report and recommendation and actually
believed that Board members were not to examine the evidence
independently. 8 Chief Justice Erickstad concluded that the Board
had a duty to review the record and determine whether
Hammond's dismissal was based on just cause. 9 Consequently, the
1. 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1984).
2. Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359, 360 (N.D. 1984).
3. Id. at 360-61.
4. Id. at 361.
5. Id. at 361-62.
6. Id. at 362. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01 to -21 (Supp. 1983).
7. 345 N.W.2d at 362-63.
8. Id. at 363.
9. Id. at 364.
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court remanded the case to the Board for a redetermination based
on the record. 10
In separate opinions written by Justice VandeWalle and
Justice Pederson, both justices expressed a concern for
misconstruing the majority's opinion by requiring all members of
an administrative agency that uses a hearing officer or referee to
read every word of the record before arriving at a conclusion."
Both justices believed that the Board could properly review the




In Hore]si v. Anderson13 a baby sitter hired by the infant
plaintiff's parents administered a severe beating to the plaintiff,
then less than one year old, resulting in severe and permanent
injuries to the infant. 14 The plaintiff's guardian ad litem brought a
suit on the plaintiffs behalf alleging separate counts of negligence
against the babysitter and the plaintiff's parents, and respondeat
superior liability against the babysitter's parents and the plaintiff's
parents. 15 The claim against the babysitter and her parents was
settled and they received a full and final release approved by the
court, discharging them from all further claims arising out of the
incident. 16
The Supreme Court of North Dakota addressed the issue of
whether the release of a servant also releases the master from
respondeat superior liability. 7 On appeal the plaintiff argued that
under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act"8 the
release of the servant (the babysitter) does not release the master
(the plaintiff's parents). 19 The plaintiff's parents argued that the
Uniform Act does not apply to the derivative or vicarious liability
of masters or principals. 20 The court agreed that the Uniform
10. Id.
11. Id. (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially); Id. (Pederson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
12. Id. (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially); Id. (Pederson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
13. 353 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1984).




18. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1976).
19. 353 N.W.2d at 317. This is the view adopted by a majority of states that have adopted the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and have subsequently addressed this issue. Id.
20. Id.
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Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act applied to the master-servant
relationship, 21 but since pertinent sections of the North Dakota Act
have been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislative adoption of
comparative negligence, 22 the court determined that the case law
from other jurisidictions was inapposite.
23
In holding that the release of the servant for his wrongful
conduct also releases the master from vicarious liability based on
respondeat superior, the court construed North Dakota Century
Code sections 32-38-0224 and 32-38-0425 together. The court stated
that under North Dakota Century Code section 32-38-04(1), the
release of the servant reduces the claim against other non-released
tortfeasors to the extent of the relative degree of fault (percentage of
negligence) attributable to the released wrongdoer servant. 26 The
court found that the "percentage of negligence" attributable to the
conduct of the servant constitutes the entire "single share" of
liability attributable jointly to the master and servant. 27 The court
reasoned that because this "percentage of negligence" represented
the "single share" of liability covered by the common liability of
the master and servant, the master is necessarily released from




Conway v. Board of County Commissioners
In Conway v. Board of County Commissioners29 a former deputy
sheriff appealed from a district court judgment affirming the Grand
Forks Board of County Commissioners' (Board) finding that he
was not entitled to receive payment for unused compensatory time
21. Id. at 318.
22. Id. In Bartels the court held that the adoption of the comparative negligence statute impliedly
amended the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to provide that the good faith release
from liability of one tortfeasor reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors by the percentage of
negligence attributable to the released joint tortfeasor. Id. (citing Bartels v. City of Williston, 276
N.W.2d 113, 121 (N.D. 1979)). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975) (comparative negligence);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04 (1) (1976) (Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act).
23. 353 N.W.2d at 318.
24. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-38-02 (1976). This section provides that "[iln determining the pro
rata shares of tort-feasors in the entire liability: . . . 2. If equity requires the collective liability of
some as a group shall constitute a single share." Id. The commissioner's comment to this section
reveals that included in the section is the rule of equity which requires class liability, including
common liability arising from vicarious relationships, to be treated as a single share. 353 N.W.2d at
318.
25. Id. at 318-20.
26. Id. at 318.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 349 N.W.2d 398 (N.D. 1984).
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earned prior to voluntary termination of his employment. 30 The
Board authorized deputy sheriffs to earn compensatory time when
on standby or on-call status.3 1 Conway claimed that when he
terminated his employment as a deputy sheriff with Grand Forks
County, he had accrued 841.35 hours of earned compensatory time
that he had been unable to use because his requests to take time off
had been denied by his superiors. 32 The controlling issue was
whether the Board had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably in denying Conway's claim for payment for his
unused compensatory time. 33 The supreme court held that Conway
was denied his right to use his compensatory time which constituted
a breach of his employment contract with the county and thus, he
was entitled to damages.
34
The supreme court stated that the resolution of April 1979
authorizing compensatory time was a valid action of the Board and
was the result of contract negotiations between the Board and the
county deputy sheriffs. 35 Therefore, the resolution was a binding
element of the county's contractual employment relationship with
Conway.36 The court further stated that the Board had a legal duty
to honor its commitment to provide compensatory time off to
Conway.37 The court agreed with a holding by the Missouri Court
of Appeals which stated that unless an employee received his pay
for unused compensatory time, the time would not be
compensatory. 38 Since Conway had made requests to use his
compensatory time and those requests were denied, Conway's right
to receive compensatory time was breached.3 9 This breach entitled
Conway to a contract remedy of damages for the unused
compensatory time that he had earned. 40 The court specifically
reserved the question whether an employee who had never
30. Conway v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 N.W.2d 398, 399-400 (N.D. 1984). Conway
filed a claim for payment with the Board of County Commissioners which was denied. Id. at 399. He
appealed the Board's decision to the district court pursuant to S 11-11-39 of the North Dakota
Century Code. Id.
31. Id. The county passed a resolution in April 1979 giving deputies one hour of compensatory
time for each three hours of standby or actual on-call time. Id. The resolution became effective April
3, 1979. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 400.
34. Id. The case was remanded so that damages could be determined. Id. at 401.
35. Id. at 400.
36. Id. The supreme court cited Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d
359 (N.D. 1984) as support for the proposition that the Board's resolution became a binding element
of Conway's employment contract. 349 N.W.2d at 400.
37. Id.
38. Id. See Bruce v. City ofSt. Louis, __ Mo. App. -, 217 S.W.2d 744 (1949).
39. 349 N.W.2d at 400. Conway asserted that many of his requests to use compensatory time
were denied by his superiors because the county sheriff's department had manpower shortages. Id. at
399.
40. Id. at 4 00.
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his compensatory time would be entitled to payment for unused
compensatory time. 
41
In a strong dissent, Justice VandeWalle asserted that the
majority was usurping the Board of Commissioners' right to
develop its own policy for compensatory time. 42 Justice Vande-
Walle believed the court had no right to authorize payment for
unused compensatory time when the Board of Commissioners did
not adopt such a provision. 43 He further questioned whether the
majority would allow compensation if the employee had requested





In Thoring v. Bottonsek45 the owners of Lenny's Bar, located in
Bainville, Montana, appealed from a North Dakota district court
order granting partial summary judgment. 46 The district court
concluded as a matter of law that it had personal jurisdiction over
the bar and that North Dakota's dram shop act 47 could be applied
to assess liability against the Montana bar for an accident that
occurred in North Dakota. 48 Lenny's contended that it lacked
sufficient minimum contacts with North Dakota for the state to
assert personal jurisdiction under its long arm provisions. 49
Lenny's also contended that North Dakota's dram shop act has no
extraterritorial effect. 50 The supreme court addressed the question
of whether North Dakota's dram shop act should be given
extraterritorial effect. 5 1
The supreme court noted that Montana imposes no civil
liability on tavern keepers for injuries that result from furnishing
intoxicating beverage to a minor or a person who is already
intoxicated.5 2  The court then analyzed cases from other
41. Id. at 400-01. The court found it important that Conway's requests to use compensatory
time offhad been denied by his superiors acting on behalf of the county. Id. at 401.
42. Id. at 402 (VandeWalle,J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 350 N.W.2d 586 (N.D. 1984).
46. Thoring v. Bottonsek, 350 N.W.2d 586, 587 (N.D. 1984).
47. See N.D. CENT CODE § 5-01-06 (1975) (statutory basis of the dram shop action). The present
statute contains slightly different wording which does not affect the disposition of this appeal. 350
N.W.2d at 587 n.2.




52. Id. at 588.
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jurisdictions and concluded that the cases which imposed civil
liability on a seller of alcoholic beverages in one state for injuries
sustained in another state have done so on the basis of common law
negligence liability rather than statutory dram shop liability.
53
The supreme court concluded that North Dakota's dram shop
act has no extraterritorial effect in circumstances where the sale
took place outside of North Dakota. Thus, the trial court had erred
when it applied the law to Lenny's. 54 The determination of the
inapplicability of the dram shop act was dispositive of the appeal





In In re Reide156 The Williams County Court issued a ninety
day order committing Frieda Reidel for treatment and continued
hospitalization at the North Dakota State Hospital. 57 Prior to the
expiration of this order, the superintendent of the state hospital
petitioned the Stutsman County Court for an order of continuing
treatment. 58 The county court did not prepare any findings of fact
as required by Rule 52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure. 59 Instead, the court used a preprinted form and
summarily concluded that Reidel was mentally ill and required
further hospitalization.
60
Citing to section 25-03.1-29 of the North Dakota Century
Code, the supreme court held that the county court must submit
findings of fact in order for the appellate court to properly review
orders of involuntary commitment. 6' The court stated that a
significant purpose was served by findings of fact in assuring an
adequate factual basis for the court's conclusion to civilly commit
53. Id. at 589. See Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070
(1980); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
54. 350 N.W.2d at 591.
55. Id.
56. 353 N.W.2d 773 (N.D. 1984).
57. In re Reidel, 353 N.W.2d 773, 774 (N.D. 1984).
58. Id.
59. Id. SeeN.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (trial courts must find facts specially in every action tried upon
the facts without ajury).
60. 353 N.W.2d at 774. The court has previously expressed its displeasure with preprinted
foims. SeeIn reGast, 345 N.W.2d 42, 46 (N.D. 1984).
61. 353 N.W.2d at 775.
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mental patients. 62 The court criticized the trial court's practice of
using preprinted forms. 63 While not prohibiting their use, the court
found it was almost impossible to use preprinted forms and comply
with the requirements of statutes and due process of law. 64
The state hospital contested the requirement of factual
findings by the lower court and claimed that the supreme court had
de novo review in civil commitment cases. 65 The state hospital
analogized civil commitment to juvenile court matters in which the
scope of the supreme court's review is similar to trial de novo. 66
The supreme court disagreed. While noting that it did have express
authority under section 27-20-56(1) of the North Dakota Century
Code to review de novo in juvenile matters, no similar provisions in





In State v. Kranz68 the defendant appealed his conviction of
menacing, claiming that he had not affirmatively waived his
constitutional right to a jury trial. 69 The supreme court noted that
both the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure and North
Dakota statutes permit a defendant to waive trial by jury. 70 The
issue on appeal was whether the defendant's conduct by standing
mute and proceeding with the bench trial constituted a waiver of his
right to a jury trial.
71
The court stated that any person "accused of serious crimes"
has a constitutional right to a jury trial. 72 Although the right to a
jury trial in criminal matters may be waived, its great importance
"precludes a defendant from waiving the right to trial by jury
without the express, intelligent consent of the defendant and consent
of the prosecutor and judge." 73 The court found that Kranz's silent
62. Id. at 776.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 775.
66. Id. See N.D. CENT CODE § 27-20-56(1) (1974); In re A.N., 201 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D.
1972).
67. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODEch. 25-03.1 (Supp. 1983).
68. 353 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1984).
69. State v. Kranz, 353 N.W.2d 748, 749-50 (N.D. 1984).
70. Id. at 750. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-07.1-31, -32
(Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-16-02 (1974).
71. 353 N.W.2d at 750.
72. Id. The court determined that the charge involved was serious, since conviction could result
in imprisonment for more than 6 months. Id. at 751 n. 1.
73. Id. at 751 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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conduct had not expressly and intelligently waived a jury trial.
7 4
Thus, even though the issue was first raised on appeal, the
"constitutional dimension" of the trial court's error supported
review by the supreme court.7 5 Since issues of fact existed, the court
ruled the error could not be deemed harmless and remanded the
case for a new trial. 
76
CORPORATIONS
Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc.
In Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc. 77 the plaintiff,
Downtowner, Inc. (Downtowner), and the defendant and third-
party plaintiff, Adams, Inc. (Adams), appealed to the supreme
court from a partial summary judgment. 78 Downtowner alleges
that some time prior to January 1973 a corporation named
Weather-Rite, Inc. (Weather-Rite) manufactured a gas-fired
heater. 79 Weather-Rite, through Adams, sold the heater to Gerlach
Sheet Metal for installation in the Downtowner, a Bismarck
restaurant, in 1973. Plaintiffs alleged that in January 1978 the
heater caused a fire which damaged plaintiffs' property. 8
0
Plaintiffs alleged liability against Adams because Adams was
in the chain of sale of the product.81 Adams in turn brought claims
against Weather-Rite and Acrometal Products, Inc. (Acrometal)
alleging its right to indemnification pursuant to section 28-01.1-07
of the North Dakota Century Code. 82 Acrometal filed a motion for
summary judgment to the district court, which was granted.8 3
Of great significance to this case is the fact that in 1974
Acrometal purchased the assets of Weather-Rite.8 4 Neither the
documents of transfer nor the court order approving the sale recited
any assumption by Acrometal of Weather-Rite's liabilities. 85 The
principal issue raised on appeal is whether North Dakota should
74. Id. at 752.
75. Id. at 753.
76. Id.
77. 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984).
78. Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 119 (N.D. 1984). The
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant and third-party defendant,
Acrometal. Id. The supreme court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Id.
79. Id. The plaintiff, Downtowner, was joined by Weeda's Bath and Kitchen Shop in
commencing this action alleging products liability. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 2 8 -01.1-07 (Supp. 1983) (indemnity of seller).
83. 347 N.W.2d at 120.
84. Id. In 1974 Weather-Rite was in serious financial difficulty and the company went into
receivership in state court in Minnesota. Id. After the receivership had begun, Arcrometal purchased
the assets of Weather-Rite. Id.
85. Id.
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join a minority of jurisdictions which have granted a separate
exception or have expanded upon the "mere continuation"
exception to the general rule that a corporation which purchases the
assets of another corporation does not succeed to the liability of the
selling corporation. 
86
The supreme court held that Acrometal, the transferee
corporation, was not liable to purchasers under the products
liability theory for merely continuing its transferor's product line.
87
Acrometal did not succeed to the liabilities of the seller, Weather-
Rite.8 8 The court stated that the legislature and not the courts
should be responsible for a rule imposing strict liability upon any
successor corporation which has maintained the product line of its
predecessor.8 9 Therefore, with regard to this issue the supreme
court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Acrometal. 90
The supreme court also dealt with the question of whether
Acrometal, apart from liability as a successor, acquired an
independent duty to warn of potential dangers presented by the
heating units manufactured by Weather-Rite upon receiving notice
of those dangers. 9 1 The supreme court stated that a determination
of whether there is a nexus between Acrometal and the customers of
Weather-Rite sufficient to justify the imposition of liability on
Acrometal for negligent breach of duty to warn necessarily involves
questions of fact regarding that relationship. 92 Therefore, the
supreme court, with regard to the issue of Acrometal's alleged
negligent failure to warn of defects, held that questions of fact
precluded summary judgment. 
93
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
State v. Halvorson
In State v. Halvorson94 Wayne Halvorson appealed from a
86. Id.-at 12i. Except for four well-recognized exceptions, the long-established general rule is
that a corporation which purchases the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the liabilities
of the selling corporation. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Cyr v. B.
Often & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). Acrometal would not be liable under either this
general rule or its exceptions. 347 N.W.2d at 121.
87. 347 N.W.2d at 121.
88. Id. at 123.
89. Id. at 125. See, e.g., Leannais, 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977).
90. 347 N.W.2d at 125.
91. Id.
92. Id. The supreme court stated that it is clear that a successor corporation may acquire a duty
to warn people where defects in its predecessor's products come to the successor's attention. Id.
93. Id. The parties in this case conceded that discovery, with regard to the issue of Acrometal's
alleged failure to warn of defects, was incomplete. Id.
94. 346 N.W.2d 704 (N.D. 1984).
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judgment of conviction after a jury found Halvorson guilty of
murder for the shooting death of his estranged wife, Llana
Halvorson.95 Halvorson raised four issues on appeal: Whether the
trial court's instruction to the jury on the elements of murder
defeated the distinction between murder and manslaughter;
whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence tape
recordings of telephone conversations that took place prior to
Halvorson's arrest; whether the trial court abused its discretion in
limiting Halvorson's cross-examination of the police detective who
testified as to the statement obtained from Halvorson during the
custodial interview; and whether the trial court erred in allowing an
amendment to the criminal information on the day of trial. 96 The
North Dakota Supreme Cout affirmed Halvorson's conviction. 97
The supreme court first considered Halvorson's contention
that the jury instructions completely defeated the distinction
between murder and manslaughter and lowered the state's burden
of proof of the offense of murder. 98 The trial cout added the term
"willfully" to the statutory language of section 12.1-16-01 when it
instructed the jury on the North Dakota statutes. 99 The supreme
court stated that its earlier ruling in State v. Skjonsby'00 was support
for the proposition that the term "willfully" must be inserted in a
jury instruction on the culpability requirement for murder.'0 ' The
court pointed out that the distinction between murder and
manslaughter is maintained by the operative grading language in
section 12.1-16-01(2) of the North Dakota Century Code.' 0 2 The
court stated that the trial court's jury instructions taken as a whole
were clear and not misleading.
1 0 3
Halvorson contended that the trial court erred when it
admitted into evidence six hours of recorded telephone
conversations between Halvorson and law enforcement officers.'
0 4
During trial Halvorson objected to the admission of the tapes on
95. State v. Halvorson, 346 N.W.2d 704, 705-06 (N.D. 1984). Murder is a class AA felony.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (Supp. 1983).
96. 346 N.W.2d at 705.
97. Id. at 712.
98. Id. at 707-09.
99. Id. at 706. The court's instruction on "SOME STATUTES INVOLVED IN THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE" stated that a person is guilty of murder under § 12.1-16-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code if he "[w]illfully causes the death of another human being under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life." Id. at 706-07. This
language was taken verbatim from the statute except for the word "willfully." See N.D. CENT. CODE
12.1-16-01 (Supp. 1983).
100. 319 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1982).
101. 346 N.W.2d at 708.
102. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-16-01, -02 (Supp. 1983).
103. 346 N.W.2d at 709. If the jury instruction as a whole correctly advises the jury as to the
law, they are sufficient even if a portion standing alone may be misleading. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d
764, 774 (N.D. 1982).
104. 346 N.W.2d at 710.
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the grounds of relevancy and prejudice.1 0 5 On appeal Halvorson
contended that the tapes were inadmissible because the tapes
violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
since he was not given any Miranda warnings during the telephone
conversations.1 0 6 The supreme court upheld the trial court's ruling
that the tapes were admissible because the trial court had
considered relevancy when it ruled on the motion. 107 The supreme
court held that Halvorson's constitutional rights were not violated
because Miranda applies only when a defendant is in custody. 108
The telephone conversations took place prior to Halvorson's arrest,
so the statements were not made in a custodial situation. 109
The supreme court briefly addressed the remaining two issues
and found that the trial court's rulings were not error. 110 The trial
court's ruling limiting Halvorson's cross-examination of the
detective who took Halvorson's statement was not error because
the evidence that Halvorson wanted to obtain through cross-
examination was admitted in one form or another during the course
of the trial. 11' The endorsement of additional witnesses on the
information on the day of trial was within the trial court's
discretion. 112 The supreme court found no prejudicial errors and
refused to disturb the jury's verdict. "
3
State v. Perbix
In State v. Perbix,'114 Perbix appealed from his conviction for
possession of marijuana. 1 5 Perbix was charged with possession of
marijuana after a search of a trailer home. 1 6 The search was
authorized as a condition of Perbix's probation in a prior
conviction." 7 The search was conducted by police officers rather
than by Perbix's probation officer."18
Perbix first challenged the constitutionality of section 19-03.1 -
105. Id.; N.D. R. EVID. 402, 403.
106. 346 N.W.2d at 710-11.
107. Id. at 711.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 709-10, 712.
111. Id. at 710.
112. Id. at 712. Halvorson had actual notice of the twenty-two proposed additional witnesses
before trial. Id. In addition, most of the witnesses whose names were added to the information were
foundation witnesses. Id.
113. Id.
114. 349 N.W.2d 403 (N.D. 1984).
115. State v. Perbix, 349 N.W.2d 403, 404 (N.D. 1984).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 404-05.
118. Id. at 405.
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23(3) of the North Dakota Century Code, 119 which makes
possession of a controlled substance a strict liability offense.120 The
supreme court found that Perbix did not adequately raise or
present a constitutional challenge to the statute because he did not
set forth specific objections supported by rationale. 
121
Perbix next asserted that the supreme court should reconsider
its prior decison upholding the validity of the search resulting in his
prosecution. 122 The court held that an affidavit of a citizen member
of a legislative committee stating that the legislative intent was to
allow warrantless searches of a probationer only by his probation
officer was not a legal or justifiable ground to relitigate the issue.
123
Finally, Perbix asserted that he was denied a fair trial because
of the prosecutor's refusal to dismiss charges of possession of
contraband against Sharon Farrand or grant her immunity. 124
Farrand was originally charged as a co-defendant with Perbix but
was not subsequently prosecuted. 125 Perbix argued that he was
prevented from obtaining Farrand's potentially favorable
testimony when he called her to testify at his trial because she
asserted her fifth amendment privilege not to testify. 126 The court
found that because the prosecutor did not attempt to interfere with
Farrand's right to take the witness stand at Perbix's trial or to
discourage her from testifying on his behalf, Perbix had no right to
compel the state to dismiss charges against Farrand or grant her
immunity. 127 Furthermore, the court noted that a criminal
defendant cannot compel the state to grant immunity to a defense
witness. 28 Therefore, the court determined that the prosecutor's
decision did not violate Perbix's right to a fair trial. 129
In a special concurrence, Justice VandeWalle suggested that
the prosecutor's refusal to dismiss the action against Farrand may
well have discouraged her from testifying. 130 Justice VandeWalle
concluded that the majority opinion reached the correct result,
however, because nothing in the record indicated what Farrand
would testify to if she were required to testify.' 3 ' In order to reverse
119. Id. at 404. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(3) (Supp. 1983) (Uniform Controlled
Substances Act).
120. 349 N.W.2d at 404 (citing State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1982)).
121. 349 N.W.2d at 404.
122. Id. at 405 (citing State v. Perbix, 331 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1983)).







130. Id. at 406 (VandeWalle,J., concurring specially).
131. Id.
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a conviction, Justice VandeWalle stated that more was required





In State v. Denny133 the defendant appealed his conviction of
delivering a controlled substance. 134 The issues on appeal were (1)
whether defendant's right to due process was violated by a delay of
nearly nine months in commencing prosecution, and by the trial
court's failure to suppress in-court identification based on a
suggestive photographic identification 1 35 and (2) whether he was
denied a fair trial by the refusal of the trial court to order disclosure
of the identity of a confidential informer. 1
36
The supreme court noted summarily that the constitutional
right to a speedy trial "does not attach until a defendant 'in some
way becomes an 'accused'.' "137 Nevertheless, the court went on to
consider whether the pre-accusatorial delay might have violated the
defendant's right to due process of law. 138 Such a claim requires
more than proof of actual prejudice. 139 The reasons for the delay
are also an important factor. 140 Intentional delay by the prosecutor
for the purpose of obtaining an advantage over the accused is
impermissible if the defendant is thereby prejudiced.' 41 The court
in Denny found that the delay was related to the continuing
investigation of drug transactions.1 42 The court found this to be a
legitimate reason for delay and also concluded that Denny had
failed to show actual prejudice resulting from the delay. 1
43
On the defendant's claim that the trial court should have
ordered disclosure of a confidential informer's identity, the
supreme court stated the general rule that disclosure is not
required. 144 An exception exists, however, when the informer may
132. Id.
133. 350 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1984).
134. State v. Denny, 350 N.W.2d 25, 26-27 (N.D. 1984).
135. Id. at 27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 12 (right to speedy tria,
guaranteed).
136. 350 N.W.2d at 27.
137. Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971)).
138. 350 N.W.2d at 27.
139. Id. at 27-28.
140. Id. at 28.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 28-29.
144. Id. at 29 (citing N.D. R. EvID. 509).
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C'give testimony relevant to any issue in a criminal case.' ,,145
Disclosure may be justified if the interests of the defendant
outweigh the public's interest in effective law enforcement.
146
Applying a totality of the circumstances test, the supreme court
concluded that information provided by the informant was
substantiated by other testimony and that Denny had not met his
burden of demonstrating an exception to the nondisclosure
privilege. 
147
Denny's final claim of prejudice was that an officer's in-court
identification was based on a suggestive photographic identification
and thus denied him due process of law. 148 The allegedly suggestive
procedure was the officer's viewing of a single photograph of
Denny in a police file after seeing him during the drug
transaction. 149  The court stated that "single photograph
identifications should generally be avoided because they are unduly
suggestive .... ,,150 Whether such identification is unduly sugges-
tive depends on the witness' prior opportunity to view the
defendant and his degree of attention, the accuracy of the prior
description, the certainty of the later identification, and the time
between the crime and the photographic identification. 151 In the
present case, the court found that the officer had a good view of the
defendant at the crime scene, was trained to pay attention to detail,
and was highly certain of his identification.152 Further, the viewing
occurred the same evening as the crime. 153 The court thus held that
the suggestive procedure did not result in a substantial likelihood of
misidentification. 154
State v. Gross
In State v. Gross155 the supreme court upheld Gross' conviction
of gross sexual imposition in connection with his twelve-year old
daughter.156 At a prior juvenile court proceeding, Gross admitted,
after being advised of his right to remain silent and that any
admission could be used in any subsequent criminal proceeding,
145. 350 N.W.2d at 29 (quoting N.D. R. EvID. 509 (c) (2)).
146. 350 N.W.2d at 29.
147. Id. at 29-30.
148. Id. at 30.
149. Id.
150. Id.




155. 351 N.W.2d 428 (N.D. 1984).
156. State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 429 (N.D. 1984). See N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-20-03
(Supp. 1983).
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that he had an incestuous relationship with his daughter. 157 On the
issue of whether Gross' fifth amendment right against compelled
self:incrimination was violated when the state in the subsequent
criminal trial used his admission made at the juvenile court
proceeding, the court held that Gross had knowingly and
intelligently waived his right against compelled self-
incrimination. 158 The court noted that he was not under arrest at
the time of the juvenile court proceeding, that he had been
represented by counsel at the juvenile hearing, that he had been
advised of his right not to incriminate himself, and that he had been
informed of the consequences if he made any admission. 
159
On the issue whether the jury should have been instructed that
gross sexual imposition includes a fourth element that the sexual
contact had to be done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire, the court held that the jury finding that Gross had
engaged in sexual intercourse established beyond a reasonable
doubt that the sexual act was for the purpose of arousal or sexual
gratification. 160 Therefore it was harmless error that the jury was
not instructed on the fourth element. 161
Gross had requested a new jury panel prior to the criminal
trial, alleging that recall of the same panel members after the court
had dismissed them and telling the panel that the parties had
reached a settlement, constituted actual bias of each panel
member. 162 The court ruled that existence of actual bias must be
determined from voir dire examinations of prospective jurors 163 and
that the recall was not actual bias per se. 164 The court presumed the
jury acted impartially, absent evidence to the contrary. 1
65
On appeal Gross also asserted that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to exclude the prejudicial testimony of a
physician. 166 At trial the daughter's examining physician testified
that the examination of the daughter revealed that her hymen was
not intact. 167 The testimony was contrary to the medical report
prepared by the physician and distributed to Gross prior to trial. 16
8
The physician explained the inconsistency by stating that the
157. 351 N.W.2d at 430.
158. Id. at 431-32.
159. Id. at 432.
160. Id. at 430-31 (citing State v. Jenkins, 326 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1982)).
161. 351 N.W.2d at 431.
162. Id. at 432. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-35(2) (1974) (defining actual bias).
163. 351 N.W.2d at 432 (citing State v. Ternes, 259 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 944 (1978)).
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written report was incorrect. 169 The court found that Rule 403 of
the North Dakota Rules of Evidence grants trial courts wide
discretion as to the introduction of evidence.' 7 ° The court
concluded that any unfair prejudice could have been remedied by a
motion for a continuance. 171 Because no motion for a continuance
was made, the court held that the trial court properly denied Gross'
motion to exclude the physician's testimony. 172
Finally, Gross argued that the jury should have been
instructed to view the social worker complainant's testimony with
caution. 17 3 The court stated that such a cautionary instruction
would allow the complainant to be treated differently from other
witnesses and from other victims of crime. 174 The court determined
that a general instruction concerning the jury's duty to weigh the
evidence properly protected Gross' right to a fair trial. 175
State v. Hegland
In State v. Hegland176 the defendant appealed from the trial
court's order denying his motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.177  The defendant was convicted of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor and delivering alcoholic
beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age. 178 The state's
key witness was a minor who testified that he consumed beer while
in the defendant's residence and in the presence of the
defendant. 1
79
Approximately a month after his conviction the defendant
filed his motion for a new trial, accompanied by two affidavits
stating that the minor witness had not drunk any beer in the
defendant's residence on the night in question. 180 This motion was
denied.' 8 ' Nearly five months later the defendant filed another
motion, this one supported by an affidavit of the minor witness
169. Id.
170. Id. See N.D. R. EvID. 403.
171. 351 N.W.2d at 433.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 434.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 355 N.W.2d 803 (N.D. 1984).
177. State v. Hegland, 355 N.W.2d 803, 804 (N.D. 1984). The motion for a new trial was
brought pursuant to Rule 33(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which specifies
that the motion must be supported by affidavits and brought within 30 days after discovery of the
new facts. Id. at 804 (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 33(b) (1984)).
178. 355 N.W.2d at 804.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 804-05.
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stating that he had lied during the trial. 18 2 On appeal from the
denial of the second motion for a new trial, the supreme court
considered whether the motion should have been granted on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence. 1
8 3
The court first noted that a trial court's decision whether to
grant a new trial is discretionary and will not be set aside absent an
abuse of discretion. 184 Moreover, a new trial should not be granted
on the basis of recanted or allegedly perjured testimony unless it
appears that a different verdict would be reached. 8 5 The court
stated a three-prong test for granting a new trial based on false
testimony:
(a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that the
testimony given by a material witness is false.
(b) That without it the jury might have reached a different
conclusion.
(c) That the party seeking the new trial was taken by
surprise when the false testimony was given and was
unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until
after the trial. 1
8 6
Without adopting this rule, the court found that the first and third
prongs had not been met. 187 The court stated that because the
defendant claimed to be innocent, he must have known at trial that
the witness' testimony was false. 88 He could have discovered the
testimony prior to trial by requesting a list of prosecution witnesses
and their statements. 18 9 Thus, the defendant could not now
complain of surprise. 190 Finding no abuse of discretion, the
supreme court affirmed the order denying a new trial. 191
State v. Kunze
In State v. Kunze, 192 Kunze appealed his sentencing on two state
counts of theft of property and two federal counts of possession of a




186. Id. at 806 (quoting the "Larrison rule" [Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.
1928)] as set forth in State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 584-85 (Minn. 1982)).
187. 355 N.W.2d at 806.
188. Id.
189. Id. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 16(o.
190. 355 N.W.2d at 806-07.
191. Id. at 807.
192. 350 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1984).
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firearm. 193 Kunze had requested, under Rule 35 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the state sentence be
made to run concurrently with the time served under the federal
sentence. 194 The state district court amended the state sentence by
changing the time when the state sentence commenced to the date
Kunze was released from serving the federal sentence. 195 Kunze
subsequently made application under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Act' 96 to have the original sentence reinstated and to have the state
sentence run concurrently with the federal sentence. 197 Kunze
additionally requested credit for the time he had already served
since September 15, 1982.198
The supreme court addressed the question of whether the
change in the original sentence was a reduction of sentence so as to
come within Rule 35(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 199 The court relied on section 12.1-32-02(6) of the
North Dakota Century Code200 to determine that the original
sentence had commenced at twelve o'clock noon on September 15,
1982 and that in effect the amended sentence was erroneous as it
changed the time when the state sentence was to commence. 20 1 The
supreme court found section 12.1-32-11(1) of the North Dakota
193. State v. Kunze, 350 N.W.2d 36, 37 (N.D. 1984). Kunze was sentenced to five years in the
North Dakota State Penitentiary to commence at 12:00 noon on September 15, 1982 on count one,
and to a five years' suspended sentence on count two. Id. at 37. Eight days after the state imposed its
sentence for theft of property, the United States District Court found Kunze guilty on two counts of
possessing a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony and sentenced him to two
years on each count, to run consecutively. Id. The United States district judge also recommended
that the federal sentence be served at the state penitentiary and that the sentence run concurrently
with the sentence imposed in state district court on September 15, 1982. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. N.D. CENT. CODEch. 29-32 (1974).
197. 350 N.W.2d at 37-38. Kunze contended that the amended sentence, dated December 1,
1982, changing the time when the state sentence commenced, violated Rule 35, North Dakota Rules
of Criminal Procedure, and his protection against double jeopardy as guaranteed by Article V of the
United States Constitution. Id.
198. Id. at 38.
199. Id. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 35(b). Rule 35(b) provides:
(b) Reduction of Sentence. The sentencing court may reduce a sentence within 120
days after the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within
120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court of the United
States denying review of, or having the effect of upholding a judgment of conviction.
The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as provided by
law. Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation
constitutes a permissible reduction of sentence under this subdivision. Relief under
this rule may be granted by the court only upon motion of a party or its own motion
and notice to the parties. If the sentencing court grants relief under this Rule, it shall
state its reasons therefor in writing.
Id.
200. N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-32-02(6) (1976). Section 12.1-32-02(6) provides that a "term of
imprisonment commences at the time of sentencing . . . unless the court orders the term to
commence at some other time. '' Id.
201. 350 N.V.2d at 38-39.
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Century Code as expressive of the state and federal courts' need for
"comity and a spirit of cooperation" in the commitment of persons
in penal facilities. 20 2 The court stated that the state district court's
amendment to the original sentence prevented the sentence from
being served concurrently, in effect extending Kunze's sentence for
four years. 20 3 Accordingly, the court held that the amended
judgment and sentence increased Kunze's penalty in derogation of
Rule 35 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 20 4 The
court ordered that the amended judgment and sentence of the state
district court be vacated and the case remanded with the instruction
that Kunze be given credit for time served both in county jail and in
any federal correctional institution and that Kunze serve his
remaining time at the state penitentiary. 205
State v. Larson
In State v. Larson20 6 the state appealed a lower court ruling
suppressing evidence against the defendants, who were charged
with violations of state game laws. 207 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed. 2
08
Defendants' alleged illegal waterfowl hunting activities had
been observed by game warden officials throughout the day. 20 9
State and federal wildlife officials entered the hunting camp in late
afternoon. 210 The officials questioned the defendants and began a
futile search of the area in an attempt to locate the ducks illegally
taken. 211 One of the officials then told defendant Larson that he
202. Id. at 39. North Dakota Century Code S 12.1-32-11(1) provides:
Unless the court otherwise orders, when a person serving a term of commitment
imposed by a court of this state is committed for another offense or offenses, the
shorter term or the shorter remaining term shall be merged in the other term. When a
person on probation or parole for.an offense committed in this state is sentenced for
another offense or offenses, the period still to be served on probation or parole shall be
merged in any new sentence of commitment or probation. A court merging sentences
under this subsection shall forthwith furnish each of the other courts previously
involved and the penal facilities in which the defendant is confined under sentence
with authenticated copies of its sentence, which shall cite the sentences being merged.
A court which imposed a sentence which is merged pursuant to this subsection shall
modify such sentence in accordance with the effect of the merger.
Id. n.1 (quotingN.D. CENT. CoDE § 12.1-32-11(l)(1976)).
203. 350 N.W.2d at 39.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 343 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1984).
207. State v. Larson, 343 N.W.2d 361, 362-63 (N.D. 1984). The court ruled that the evidence
was obtained in violation of the defendants' fourth and fifth amendment rights. Id.
208. Id. at 366.
209. Id. at 362.
210. Id.
211. Id. The defendants had taken ducks in excess of the statutory limit. Id.
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would give him "one chance and one chance only to show me
[where the ducks are hidden] or we will bring down six wardens
and four dogs. "212 Defendant Larson, not having received any
Miranda warnings during the investigation, took the official to the
locations where the ducks were hidden. 21 3 Defendants Larson and
Johnsen were later arrested and charged with shooting ducks in
excess of their limit.
2 14
The state argued that a search warrant was unnecessary since
the surveillance and search of the camp was permissible in light of
the "open fields" doctrine. 21 5 The supreme court avoided a
decision based on the open fields doctrine and concluded that the
search was involuntary. 21 6 The supreme court considered the
totality of the circumstances, including the official's threat that
dogs and wardens would be brought in, the suggestion that the
children in the hunting party should be taken far away, the size of
the official doing the talking, and the fact that the wardens did not
ask permission to search. 217  Moreover, the supreme court
concluded that the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was violated because no Miranda warnings were
given and because the wardens should have known that their
threats would elicit an incriminating response. 218
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
First Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Haley
In First Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Haley2 1 9 the First
Federal Savings and Loan Association of Grand Forks and Minot
appealed from the judgment of the district court granting to First
Federal foreclosure on certain real property, but providing that the
six-month redemption period ran from the date of the sheriffs
sale. 220
The only, issue raised on appeal was whether section 32-19.1-
04.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, which changes the date on
which the redemption period begins to run, may be applied to
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 363.
215. Id. The "open fields" doctrine limits fourth amendment protection to a person's papers,
houses, and effects. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
216. 343 N.W.2d at 364-65.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 365-66.
219. 357 N.W.2d 492 (N.D. 1984).
220. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Haley, 357 N.W.2d 492, 493 (N.D. 1984).
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mortgages executed prior to the effective date of the statute, July 1,
1981.221 Under pre-1981 law the period of redemption ran from the
date of the sheriff's sale and since July 1, 1981 the period of
redemption runs from the date of filing of the summons and
complaint.222
Both the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of North Dakota prohibit the passage of
any law which would impair the obligations of existing contacts.
223
The Supreme Court of the United States has also held that statutes
which alter or modify the redemption period cannot be
constitutionally applied to mortgages executed prior to the effective
date of the statute.
224
The court concluded that section 32-19.1-04.1 shortens the
period of redemption and therefore cannot be constitutionally
applied to mortgages executed prior to its effective date. 225 The
judgment of the district court was affirmed. 
226
First Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Scherle
In First Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Scherle2" First
Federal Savings and Loan of Bismarck appealed from a summary
judgment dismissing its complaint against the defendants,
individual guarantors of a promissory note, for the balance of the
note. 228 While this action was pending, First Federal obtained a
judgment of foreclosure on the real estate mortgage executed by the
same individual guarantors as additional security for the loan. 229
First Federal then purchased the mortgaged real estate at a sheriff's
sale for the sum awarded in its prior judgment of foreclosure,
together with accrued interest and costs. 230 The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed First
Federal's action, finding that First Federal had satisfied its
judgment of foreclosure by purchasing the property for the
judgment amount. 231 Thus, since the judgment of foreclosure was
satisfied and the debt therefore paid, the district court concluded
221. Id.
222. Id. at 494.
223. Id. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10; N.D. CONST. art. I, S 18.
224. 357 N.W.2d at 494 (citing Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U.S. 1 (1904); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163
U.S. 118 (1896)).
225. 357 N.W.2d at 495.
226. Id.
227. 356 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1984).
228. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Scherle, 356 N.W.2d 894, 895 (N.D. 1984).
229. Id.*
230. Id.
231. Id. at 895-96.
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that First Federal could not proceed against the defendants as
guarantors. 1
32
The issue raised on appeal was whether First Federal could
maintain its action against the defendants as individual
guarantors. 233 The supreme court affirmed the district court's
ruling stating that First Federal had satisified its mortgage by
purchasing the mortgaged property for the amount of the
underlying debt, thus the debt was satisfied and, since one cannot
guarantee payment on a nonexistent debt, the defendants'
individual guaranties were extinguished.
234
Finally, since First Federal contended that the case of Bank of
Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller2 35 implicitly would allow its independent
action against the defendants on the basis of their individual
guaranties, 236 the court noted that a prior opinion is only
controlling as to the points decided therein; any expression of
opinion on a question not necessary for decision is merely dicta,
and is not in any way controlling upon later decisions. 237
Kessel v. Peterson
In Kessel v. Peterson238 the Petersons moved to dismiss Kessel's
appeal from a judgment entered against him prior to his filing
bankruptcy. 239 The Petersons claimed that the automatic stay
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 240 prevent the state supreme
court from acquiring jurisdiction of an appeal filed after the
appellant has filed a bankruptcy petition. 24 1 The court stated that in
order to determine whether a proceeding is stayed as an action
against the debtor under the automatic stay provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, the critical focus should be on the debtor's status
at the initial proceedings rather than on the label the debtor is
given.
2 42
The court reasoned that because the appeal resulted from a
232. Id. at 896.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 294 N.W.2d 640 (N.D. 1980).
236. 356 N.W.2d at 896.
237. Id. at 897.
238. 350 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1984).
239. Kessel v. Peterson, 350 N.W.2d 603, 604 (N.D. 1984).
240. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1982).
241. 350 N.W.2d at 604. The Petersons had obtained a judgment on a counterclaim against
Kessel rescinding certain land contracts and awarding the Petersons a money judgment. Id. The
judgment was entered on September 29, 1983. Id. A writ of execution was issued October 13, 1983
on this judgment and was returned unsatisfied on November 3 because Kessel filed a petition in
bankruptcy under Chapter 13 on October 31. Id. On November 7 Kessel filed a notice of appeal from
the September 29judgment. Id.
242. Id. at 605.
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judgment on a counterclaim in which Kessel was essentially a
defendant, the action was one against the debtor and the action is
stayed unless the bankruptcy court grants relief. 243 Therefore, the
court denied the Petersons' motion to dismiss and stayed Kessel's
appeal pending further action by the bankruptcy court. 244
DUTY TO WARN
Patch v. Sebelius
In Patch v. Sebelius 245 the court held that contractors have the
authority to erect additional warning signs when necessary to
protect the safety of the public. 246 Patch had appealed from a jury
verdict finding that the highway contractors performing road work
in the construction area where Patch was injured were not
negligent.247 Patch was injured when the vehicle he was driving
collided with a semitrailer driven by Sebelius. 2 48 At trial Patch
contended that the contractors had a duty to erect warning signs in
addition to the warning signs required by the construction
contract. 24 9 The defendant contractors claimed that under section
2A-3 of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices
(MUTCD),2 5 0 the North Dakota State Highway Department had
exclusive authority respecting placement of warning signs on North
Dakota highways. 2 51 The trial court held that, as a matter of law,
the State Highway Department had exclusive control over the
placement of warning signs and that the contractors' only duty was
to place the signs that were specifically provided for in the plans and
specifications.
252
The controlling issue on appeal was whether the State
Highway Department granted authority to the contractors to erect
warning signs in addition to those specifically enumerated in the
plans and specifications.2 53 In holding that contractors have the
authority to erect additional Warning signs when necessary to
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 349 N.W.2d 637 (N.D. 1984).
246. Patch v. Sebelius, 349 N.W.2d 637, 642 (N.D. 1984).
247. Id. at 638.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 639.
250. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSP., MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROLS S 2A-3 (1971).
The North Dakota State Highway Commissioner adopted the MUTCD as standards for state
highways pursuant to statute. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-13-06 (1980).
251. 349 N.W.2d at 639.
252. Id. at 640.
253. Id.
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protect the safety of the motoring public, the court reviewed
the provisions in the MUTCD, the construction contracts, and case
law in other states. 25 4 The court found that the MUTCD provides
that construction contractors have authority to erect temporary
signs at work sites to protect the public. 255 The contracts between
the State Highway Department and the contractors provided that
contractors were required to take any action reasonably necessary
to protect the safety of the public while performing highway
construction. 256 The court agreed with the conclusion of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Ferguson v. Benson257 that a road
contractor is in the best position to know of any dangerous
conditions created by its activities and he is, therefore, required to
warn unwary motorists of those dangerous conditions.2 58 The
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that when hazardous
conditions occur, the contractor is in the best position to know of





In State v. Fischer260 the state appealed from an order of the
County Court of Cass County granting defendant's motion to
dismiss the charge of issuing a check without sufficient funds.
261
The case raised two issues: whether section 6-08-16 of the North
Dakota Century Code 262 violates the equal protection clause of the
United State Constitution and, if it does, whether the infirm
language could be severed from the statute. 
263
The supreme court of North Dakota affirmed the trial court's
finding that the relevant language of section 6-08-16 of the North
Dakota Century Code is substantively identical to the language of
254. Id. at 640-41.
255. Id. at 639.
256. Id. at 640.
257. 309 Minn. 160, 244 N.W.2d 116(1976).
258. 349 N.W.2d at 641 (citing Ferguson v. Benson, 309 Minn. 160, -, 244 N.W.2d 116,
120 (1976)).
259. 349 N.W.2d at 641.
260. 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1984).
261. State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D. 1984).
262. Id. Section 6-08-16 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that it is a class B
misdemeanor to "make, draw, utter, or deliver" a check if there are not sufficient funds to pay the
check in full upon its presentation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16(1) (Supp. 1983). The portion of the
section at issue in this case states that "[p]ayment to holder of the face amount of the instrument,
plus any collection fees or costs, not exceeding the additional sum of ten dollars, shall constitute a
defense to a criminal charge brought hereunder if paid within ten days from receipt of this notice of
dishonor." N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16(4) (Supp. 1983).
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section 6-08-16.2, which was declared unconstitutional in State v.
Carpenter.264 Thus the court held that section 6-08-16 created a
classification based on wealth in violation of the equal protection
clause and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
265
The supreme court found that removing the infirm language
of the statute served to foster the harsh result of the strict liability
element of the statute. 266 The court could not conclude that the
legislature intended the statute to stand without the affirmative
defense language, and thus held that section 6-08-16 of the North
Dakota Century Code is unconstitutional and invalid in its
entirety. 267 The supreme court thus affirmed the trial court's order
dismissing the charges against Fischer.
268
ESTATES
In re Estate of Knudsen
In In re Estate of Knudsen269 the supreme court held that life
insurance benefits and joint tenancy arrangements are "transfers"
for the purposes of the omitted spouse statute, which entitles an
omitted spouse to an intestate share unless the omission was
intentional or the testator provided for the spouse by transfers
outside the will and it is shown the transfers were intended to be in
lieu of a testamentary provision.2 70 Susan Knudsen was married to
Jerry Knudsen in 1975; Jerry Knudsen's will was executed in 1962
and was never changed or supplemented.2 7 1 Susan was the
beneficiary of several life insurance policies, however, and was a
joint owner of land with Jerry.
72
In its analysis the court noted that the word "transfer" is not
defined in title 30.1 (Uniform Probate Code) of the North Dakota
Century Code.2 73 Further, the court noted that the editorial board
comment to the omitted spouse statute does not mention that life
insurance benefits and joint tenancy properties constitute
"transfers. ",274 The court found, however, that the editorial board
263. 349 N.W.2d at 18.
264. Id. See State v..Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1980).




269. 342 N.W.2d 387 (N.D. 1984).
270. In re Estate of Knudsen, 342 N.W.2d 387, 391 (N.D. 1984). See N.D. CENT. CODE 30.1-
06-01 (1976).
271. 342 N.W.2d at 388.
272. Id. at 388-89.




comments to the augmented estate statute and the pretermitted
children statute speak of transfers such as life insurance and joint
accounts.27 5 The court also looked at the Uniform Probate Code
Practice Manual, which refers to transfers outside the will, such as
life insurance or joint tenancy arrangements. 7 6 Finally, the court
followed the Arizona and New Mexico courts which recognize that
life insurance and joint tenancy property can be included as
"transfers" within the omitted spouse statute. 277 The court also
found that the jury could determine from the amount of the
transfers alone whether the decedent intended the transfers to be in




In State v. Ronngren279 the supreme court adopted the guidelines
from Illinois cases in applying a forfeiture provision in the North
Dakota controlled substances statute. 28 0 James andJudy Ronngren
were convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver. 28 1 During a search of their home the State seized $1,835.282
After their conviction the Ronngrens filed an application to apply
the confiscated monies to attorney fees. 28 3 The trial court ordered
the return of the money to the Ronngrens and the state appealed.284
The supreme court noted that the North Dakota controlled
substances statute, similar to the Illinois statute, identifies money
as an item subject to forfeiture, whereas the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act does not. 285 The court then adopted the following
Illinois guidelines for handling proceedings involving forfeitures: 1)
forfeiture proceedings are in rem and are considered civil in nature;
2) the State must prove its right to the property by a preponderance
of evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt; and, 3) after the State
has demonstrated that the money is connected to the offense (prima
275. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (Supp. 1983) for the augmented estate statute, and
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-02 (1976) for the pretermitted children statute.
276. 342 N.W.2d at 390-91. See 1 UNIFOEM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 115 (2d ed. 1977).
277. 342 N.W.2d at 391. See In re Estate ofBeaman, 119 Ariz. 614, 583 P.2d 270 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978) and In re Estate ofTaggart, 95 N.M. 117, 619 P.2d 562 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
278. 342 N.W.2d at 392.
279. 356 N.W.2d 903 (N.D. 1984).
280. State v. Ronngren, 356 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D. 1984). See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 19-03.1
(1981).
281. 356 N.W.2d at 904. The Ronngrens were in violation ofN.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(1)
(Supp. 1983).
282. 356 N.W.2d at 904.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 905-06.
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facie), the defendant has the burden of showing that portion of the
money seized was not related to the violation. 28 6 In this instance,
the court ruled that the State had proved a prima facie case that the
money was profits from drug sales, and that the Ronngrens had




In re Otter Tail Power Co.
In In re Otter Tail Power Co. 288 the Public Service Commission
(PSC) and Baker Electric Cooperative appealed from the district
court judgment holding that the PSC did not have jurisdiction to
act over the territorial service areas of competing utilities when the
service point is within an Indian reservation. 289 Otter Tail Power
contended that the issue was not one of jurisdiction, but rather was
one concerned with the impairment of rights granted by federal law
and interference with federal regulation of land use contrary to the
supremacy clause. 
290
The North Dakota Supreme Court first examined the posture
of the case to determine if the supremacy question could be raised
for the first time at a district court level on an appeal from a
decision of the PSC. 291 The court refered to a similar confrontation
in Johnson v. Elkin, 292 where a divided court concluded that under
the Administrative Agencies Practice Act (Ch. 28-32, N.D. Cent.
Code) constitutional issues can be raised for the first time at the
district court level "under certain circumstances. ' 293 Thus the
court concluded that although a collateral proceeding would have
been more appropriate, the federal supremacy question could
properly be raised for the first time at the district court level on
appeal from the PSC decision. 294
286. Id. at 906.
287. Id.
288. 354 N.W.2d 701 (N.D. 1984).
289. In re Otter Tail Power Co., 354 N.W.2d 701, 703 (N.D. 1984).
290. Id. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides in part:
This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST.,art. VI (quoted in In re Otter Tail Power Co., 354 N.W.2d at 703 n.5).
291. 354 N.W.2d at 703.
292. 263 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1978).
293. 354 N.W.2d at 704.
294. Id.
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The court next examined the issue of whether the PSC was
barred by the supremacy clause from exercising jurisdiction.
295
Referring to Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen,296 Justice Sand, for a
unanimous court, wrote:
Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state
legislation in the same field nevertheless override state
laws with which they conflict. U.S. Const., art. VI. The
criterion for determining whether or not there is such a
conflict is whether the state's law 'stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress, . . . 297
After noting that the objective of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
was to contract for energy at the new school with the supplier
selected pursuant to PSC requirements, it cannot be said that the
PSC action provided an "obstacle" to the federal purpose, thus the
judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was
remanded for entry of judgment affirming the determination of the
PSC.2 98 The court also commented on the fact that this case did not
infringe upon the right of tribal self-government. 299
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Mini Mart, Inc. v. City of Minot
In Mini Mart, Inc. v. City of Minot300 the city of Minot appealed
from a judgment entered by the District Court of Ward County
granting a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the city to issue
a retail beer license to Mini Mart, Inc. 30 1 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. 30
2
The city denied Mini Mart's application on the basis of
unwritten criteria, but urged the trial court to take judicial notice of
the demography of the area, the geography, and the public mood
regarding drunk driving in determining whether the city council
abused its discretion. 30 3 The court will not reverse a trial court's
295. Id. at 705.
296. 314 N.W.2d 32 (N.D. 1981).
297. 354 N.W.2d at 705.
298. Id. at 705-06.
299. Id. at 705.
300. 347 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1984).
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issuance or denial of a writ of mandamus unless, as a matter of law,
such writ should not be issued or there is a finding that the trial
court abused its discretion. 30 4 The court upheld the trial court's
decision that Mini Mart was not granted a license because the
Minot City Council had gone beyond the bounds set by the Minot
Code of Ordinances,3 0 5 and not on the trial court's conclusion that
the city had preserved an inadequate record of proceedings.
30 6
The city council also passed an ordinance prohibiting a
business from selling both liquor and gasoline. 30 7 The court also
concluded that any attempt by the city of Minot to amend its
existing ordinances by resolution was ineffective. 30 8 The court also
held that, when exercising its discretion, the city must use written
criteria which adequately inform applicants of the city's standards
and policies and guide the licensing authority in arriving at its
decision.
30 9
The court indicated that fundamental fairness was the guide in
determining whether a city had legitimate guidelines. 31 0 The
supreme court upheld the trial court's ruling that the city could not
rely on unwritten and unspecified criteria in denying Mini Mart's
application. 31 1 Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's holding that section 5-28 (e) of the Minot Code of
Ordinances31 2 must be read narrowly and therefore could not be






In Olson v. Schwartz3t 4 lessees of oil and gas leaseholds appealed
district court judgments decreeing cancellation of portions of the
304. Id. at 135 (citing Eckre v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 656, 665-66. (N.D. 1976)).
305. 347 N.W.2d at 137.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 135.
308. Id. at 138.
309. Id. at 141.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. Section 5-28(e) of the Minot Code of Ordinances provides:
Upon the receipt by the city council of the report, or reports, the city council shall
determine whether or not in its opinion the building proposed to be used is suitable
and proper for use as an alcoholic beverage licensed place of business. In the event that
the city council shall feel that the structure is not sufficient for the general welfare and
safety of the general public, then such application shall be denied. Upon such denial,
the city auditor shall notify the applicant of such denial.
MINOT, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES S 5-28(e) (1983).
313. 347 N.W.2d at 141.
314. 345 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 1984).
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leaseholds on the theory of abandonment.3 1 5 The appellants, Lund
and Prosper Energy Corporation, raised two issues: whether the
trial court erred in finding that there had been an abandonment of
the undeveloped portions of the leaseholds, 31 6 and whether the trial
court erred in failing to rule and order judgment in favor of lessees
on the plaintiffs' claims of breach of implied covenents.
317
The lessors argued that where there has been a long failure to
explore or drill on available portions of an oil and gas lease, and
where the lessees have no present intention of developing those
portions of the leasehold, there is a legal presumption that the
lessees have abandoned those portions even though no physical
relinquishment has been shown. 31 8 The lessees argued that the
leases are maintained over the entire acreage of their respective
leaseholds by production from stripper wells. 319 Additionally, the
lessees contended that cancellation of a portion of a leasehold under
such circumstances could only be granted upon proof of breach of
implied covenants, following notice and demand.
320
The North Dakota Supreme Court found the evidence
insufficient to sustain a finding of abandonment since the facts
before the court established neither an intention to abandon nor a
physical relinquishment. 32' The court stated that the mere non-use
of a portion of a leasehold which is held by production is not
sufficient to establish intent to abandon the lease. 322 The court also
stated that in North Dakota, a lessor may be entitled to relief under
the theory of breach of implied covenant of reasonable development
where the particular facts of the case disclose that the particular
lessee has not developed a particular lease in conformity with the
reasonably prudent operator standard.3 23 Although the court noted
that each lease did carry an implied covenant of reasonable
development, the facts before it were insufficient to support a
finding of a breach of such a covenant.32 4 The court went on to state
315. Olson v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33, 34 (N.D. 1984). The appeals of Vern Lund and
Prosper Energy Corporation were consolidated for argument. Id. at 35. The appeals rose from two
leases: the Olson lease and the Larsen lease. Id. at 34-35.
316. Id. at 35.




321. Id. at 38.
322. Id. Throughout its discussion of the abandonment doctrine the court relied heavily upon
Hermon Hansen Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 77 N.D. 20, 40 N.W.2d 304 (1949). See 345 N.W.2d at 36-
38, 40.
323. 345 N.W.2d at 39. In noting factors to be considered in applying the prudent operator
standard, the court cited Sanders v. Birmingham, 214 Kan. 769, 522 P.2d 959, 966 (1974). 345
N.W.2d at 39-40. The court also added other factors to be considered to this list. See 345 N.W.2d at
40.
324. 345 N.W.2d at 40.
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that although a breach of the implied covenant of reasonable
development may result in a forfeiture of the lease, before a lessor is
entitled to that relief he must show that he has made demand of the
lessee to comply with the implied covenant and has allowed a
reasonable time for such compliance. 325 Accordingly, the court





Sexton v. J. E. H.
In Sexton v. J.E.H.32 7 respondent appealed from a juvenile
court judgment terminating her parental rights to two children.328
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's
ruling .329
Both of respondent's children were placed in a foster home
after one of the children received an unexplained head injury. 330
Approximately eight months later the oldest son was returned to
respondent. 33 1 The son was again removed from his mother's care
before respondent's parental rights were terminated.
332
The court set forth three factors which the state must establish
by "clear and convincing evidence" before parental rights could be
terminated: "[T]hat the child is a 'deprived child'; that the
conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue and
will not be remedied; and that by reason of the continuous or
irremedial conditions and causes, the child is suffering or probably
will suffer serious physical [sic] mental, moral, or emotional
harm.' '333
The court held that all elements of the test were met. 334 The
fact that the younger child did not yet display the same symptoms
as the older child did not preclude the lower court from finding that
the older child was deprived.
335
325. Id. at 40-41.
326. Id. at 41.
327. 355 N.W.2d 828 (N.D. 1984).
328. Sexton v.J.E.H., 355 N.W.2d 828, 829 (N.D. 1984).
329. Id. at 832.
330. Id. at 829.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 830 (quoting McBeth v. J.J.H., 343 N.W.2d 355, 358 (N.D. 1984)).
334. 355 N.W.2d at 832.
335. Id.
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Anderson v. Teamsters Local 116 Building Club
In "Anderson v. Teamsters Local 116 Building Club3 36 defendant
Hysan Corporation, manufacturer of a dance wax sprinkled on the
floor of Teamsters Local 116 Building Club, appealed from a
district court order denying their motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. 337 The
district court found Hysan Corporation fifty-five percent negligent
for damages incurred by the plaintiff when she slipped, fell, and
fractured her wrist. 338 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's decision.
339
On appeal, Hysan argued that the special jury verdict finding
the product was not defective and at the same time finding Hysan
negligent was inconsistent and irreconcilable as a matter of law. 34
0
The supreme court concluded that the special jury verdict was not
inconsistent and irreconcilable as a matter of law in that Hysan
could be held liable even if the product was not defective and
unreasonably dangerous if it failed to give adequate instructions,
directions or warnings.
341
The supreme court also held that the trial cout did not err in
refusing Hysan's requested jury instructions regarding assumption
of risk. 342 In addition, the supreme court held that the trial court
properly denied Hysan's request that the jury be instructed that
plaintiff's damages would not be taxable as income. 343 Finally, a
casual reference to insurance which left the jury in doubt as to who
had the insurance was held to be harmless. 344
Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc.
In Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc. 345 Powell, a third party
defendant, appealed from a jury verdict for the plaintiff.346 The
336. 347 N.W.2d 309 (N.D. 1984).
337. Anderson v. Teamsters Local 116 Bldg. Club, 347 N.W.2d 309, 310 (N.D. 1984).
338. Id. The jury found the plaintiff forty-five percent negligent. Id. The jury further found no
negligence against defendant Teamsters Local 116 Building Club. Id.
339. Id. at 315.
340. Id. at 311.
341. Id. The court stated that thejury could have considered the question of Hysan's negligence
to mean: "Did Hysan fail to provide appropriate directions and instructions and did Hysan fail to
warn?" Id.
342. Id. at 314. Several of the contributory negligence instructions incorporated the assumption
of risk doctrine. Id.
343. Id. at 314-15.
344. Id. at 315.
345. 350 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1984).
346. Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 591, 593 (N.D. 1984).
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plaintiff, Hagert Farms, purchased certified pinto bean seed from
Hatton Commodities. 347 When the plaintiff discovered that the
bean plants were infected with a disease caused by contaminated
seed, the plaintiff had to destroy the plants and reseed. 348 Plaintiff
sued the seller, Hatton Commodities, alleging negligence, breach
of warranty, and strict liability in tort. 349 Plaintiff demanded
damages for additional expenses incurred in reseeding and loss of
profits due to reduced yield. 350 Hatton Commodities asserted a
third-party claim against the supplier, Greeley, and the processor,
Powell. 35 1 The case was submitted to the jury on the theories of
breach of warranty and strict liability. 35 2 As presented in the special
verdict form, the jury was entitled to award damages for loss of
profits under a strict liability claim. 353 Powell argued on appeal that
strict liability in tort was not applicable to a case that involved a
claim for recovery of lost profits in a commercial transaction.
354
The supreme court held that Powell was entitled to a new trial
because the verdict form misstated the law by allowing the recovery
of lost profits under strict liability in tort.
355
On appeal the court reviewed North Dakota products liability
cases and found that no prior case involved loss of profits. 356 Thus,
this case offered the court its first opportunity to discuss the
potential conflict between strict liability in tort, section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and contract remedies under the
Uniform Commerical Code. 357  Acknowledging that other
jurisdictions addressing the issue had reached opposite results,
358
the court determined that the better view was that the doctrine of
strict liability in tort had not superseded the commerical remedies
for breach of warranty in chapter 41-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 359 Consequently, the court held that economic loss
is recoverable under breach of warranty but is not recoverable
347. Id.
348. Id. The bean plants were infected with "halo blight," which is caused by contaminated
seed. Id.
349. Id. The breach of warranty claim was based on the implied warranty provisions in sections
2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 595. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31, -32
(1983). The product liability claim was based on strict liability in tort. 350 N.W.2d at 593. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965).





355. Id. at 595.
356. Id. at 593-94. Powell contended that lost profits are ordinarily recoverable only under a
contract theory. Id. at 594.
357. Id. at 594. The court held that lost profits are recoverable under a theory of breach of
implied warranty. Id. at 595.
358. Id. at 595.
359. Id.
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under strict liability in tort. 360 The court concluded that when a
case involves alternative theories of breach of warranty and strict
liability in tort, a special verdict form should be used that will
specifically indicate upon what theory of recovery an award is
made.
361
PROPERTY DIVISION UPON DIVORCE
Bullock v. Bullock
In Bullock v. Bullock362 the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's apportionment of future military retirement pay as part of a
divorce judgment. 363 In so doing the court disavowed its earlier
decision in Rust v. Rust 364 that military retirement pay was not a
divisible asset for purposes of property division on divorce.
3 65
The court noted that Rust was based on McCarty v. McCarty, 
366
in which the United States Supreme Court held "that federal law
precludes a state court from dividing military nondisability
retirement pay pursuant to state community property law. "367 The
issue in Bullock was what effect Congress' enactment of the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act 368 had on the
McCarty decision. 
369
The court examined the legislative history of the Uniformed
Former Spouses' Protection Act and concluded that Congress
intended to overrule McCarty. 370 Since Rust was based solely on
McCarty, it is no longer controlling in North Dakota on the issue of
military retirement pay. 37 1 In view of Congress' intent to effectively
overrule McCarty, the court ruled that the trial court's division of
the military retirement pay was not clearly erroneous.
372
Seablom v. Seablom
In Seablom v. Seablom373 Carole Seablom appealed from a
360. Id. The court adopted the rule of strict liability in tort in 1974. See Johnson v. American
Motors Corp., 255 N.W.2d 57, 58 (N.D. 1974).
361. 350 N.W.2d at 594. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Clark v. International Harvestor Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
362. 354 N.W.2d 904, 905 (N.D. 1984).
363. Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 905 (N.D. 1984).
364. 321 N.W.2d 504 (N.D. 1982).
365. 354 N.W.2d at 908.
366. 453 U.S. 210(1981).
367. 354 N.W.2d at 906-07.
368. Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (codified at 10 U.S.C. 1408 (1982)).
369. 354 N.W.2d at 906.
370. Id. at 907.
371. Id. at 908.
372. Id.
373. 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984).
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district court order denying the remedy of civil contempt for her ex-
husband's failure to comply with payment provisions of their
divorce decree. 374 The provision Carole had attempted to enforce
by civil contempt proceedings obligated her ex-husband to pay
$14,400.00 in thirty-six monthly installments of $400.00 per month
"as and for alimony." 375 This provision was included in a proposed
settlement presented by the parties to the district court in the
divorce action and incorporated by the court into its judgment.
376
The same judge, in later denying the civil contempt remedy, ruled
that the payments described as alimony were in fact in the nature of
a property settlement. 377 On appeal, the supreme court addressed
the issues of whether the payments constituted a property division
and whether the court could enforce the decree by using its civil
contempt powers.
378
The supreme court agreed with the trial court's
characterization of the monthly payments as a property divison.
379
Justice VandeWalle concluded that the term "alimony" is patently
ambiguous in that it can refer to either property distribution or
spousal support. 380 The court noted that the ambiguity was evident
by the fact that Carole's attorney had referred to the payment as a
property settlement throughout the divorce proceeding. 381 More
importantly, however, was the fact that the payments did not
terminate at Carole's death.3 82 The court concluded that the
purpose of alimony was either to rehabilitate spouses by aiding
them in acquiring new skills or permanently maintain parties
incapable of being rehabilitated. 383 Since neither purpose could be
effectuated after the obligee's death, the court viewed the payment
at issue as more properly characterized as a property settlement.
3 84
With respect to the civil contempt issue, the court reiterated its
earlier determination that "contempt proceedings would not lie
when a party sought to enforce a judgment for the distribution of
374. Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920, 922 (N.D. 1984). SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-03
(3)(1974)(civil contempt available as punishment for nonpayment of money, pursuant to court order
in case where, by law, sum cannot be collected by execution).
375. 348 N.W.2d at 922. The provision stated that payments of $400 per month would not
terminate on the death or remarriage of either party. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 922, 925. When Carole attempted to collect the unpaid balance of $25,000 by
execution,John Seablom and his new wife filed ajoint bankruptcy petition. Id. at 922-23.
378. Id. at 923.
379. Id. at 924-25.
380. Id. at 924. Carole's execution to enforce the $25,000 debt was returned unsatisfied because
John declared his property exempt. Id. at 922; see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-22 (1974 and Supp.
1983)(exemptions from attachment, execution and any other final process). He then filed a Chapter
7 bankruptcy petition. 348 N.W.2d at 923. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982).
381. 348 N.W.2d at 923.





property. 38 5 The court determined that Carole's remedy was to
execute on the judgment.3 8 6 Even though her writ of execution had
been returned unsatisifed, the court noted that she might later be
successful, since a judgment is valid for ten years.
387
Finally, the court addressed Carole's argument that a divorce
creditor should not be permitted to claim statutory exemptions
from process. 388 The court recognized the "obvious injustice" in
this case; however, finding no statute precluding application of the
exemption statutes to divorce judgments, it concluded that only the




In Folmer v. State390 the court held that the confiscatory price
defense, as codified in sections 28-29-04, 28-29-05 and 28-29-06 of
the North Dakota Century Code, applies to real property mortgage
foreclosures and is sufficient to enjoin a foreclosure by
advertisement. 3 91 The Folmers defaulted on their farm
mortgage. 392 The mortgage contained a provision entitling the
mortgagee, the State of North Dakota, to foreclose by
advertisement. 393 When the mortgagee served a notice of intention
to foreclose and advertised that the farm would be sold at a sheriff's
sale, the Folmers sought to enjoin the foreclosure by advertisement,
asserting the confiscatory price defense to delay foreclosure
proceedings during periods of economic hardship. 394 The district
court refused to grant the injunction, ruling that the confiscatory
price defense does not apply to a foreclosure of a real property
mortgage and that the defense does not apply to a foreclosure by
advertisement.
395
On the issue whether the confiscatory price defense statutes
apply to a foreclosure by advertisement, the court first held that the
385. Id. at 925.
386. Id. (citing Dvorak v. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d 868 (N.D. 1983)).
387. 348 N.W.2d at 925. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 28-21-01 (1974).
388. 348 N.W.2d at 925.
389. Id.
390. 346 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1984).
391. Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 733-34 (N.D. 1984). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04
to -06 (1974).
392. 346 N.W.2d at 732.
393. Id.
394. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 35-22-04 (1980) (procedure for enjoining foreclosures by
advertisement).
395. 346 N.W.2d at 732.
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defense applies to real estate mortgage foreclosures and is not
limited to the sale of agricultural products. 396 The court stated that
by the terms of section 28-29-04, the words "in any cause" would
clearly include real estate mortgage foreclosures.
397
The court next stated that in deciding whether to enjoin a
foreclosure by advertisement, a court must determine if the
mortgagor would have a counterclaim or defense that could be
pleaded in a subsequent action to foreclose. 398 The court held that
any set of facts that could be pleaded as a defense or counterclaim in
an action to foreclose may provide a sufficient basis for an
injunction of an action to foreclose by advertisement.
399
On the issue of whether the confiscatory price defense
constitutes the statutory requirement of a legal counterclaim or
defense against the collection of all or part of the amount due on a
mortgage, the supreme court rejected the state's argument that the
requirement is met only if the counterclaim or defense would
eliminate the debt or reduce the amount due on the mortgage.
40 0
Instead, the court ruled that the statute is remedial and is to be
liberally construed to protect the interests of the debtor-
mortgagor. 40 ' The court held that the confiscatory price defense is a
legal counterclaim or other valid defense that provides a sufficient
basis to enjoin a foreclosure by advertisement, thus permitting the
matter to be heard as a foreclosure by action.
40 2
Finally, the state argued that even if the confiscatory price
defense is sufficient to enjoin a foreclosure by advertisement, a
court, in its discretion, may deny the injunction.4 0 3 The supreme
court held that the court is to exercise discretion only to determine
if the statutory defense or counterclaim is raised in the affidavit. 40 4
The court concluded that if an affidavit raises a defense or
counterclaim the court may not refuse to enjoin the foreclosure by
advertisement. 405
Sibert v. Kubas
In Sibert v. Kubas406 plaintiff brought a quiet title action to
396. Id. at 733.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 734.
399. Id. (citing Scott v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist., 15 N.D. 259, 107 N.W.2d 61
(1906)).
400. 346 N.W.2d at 734.
401. Id. (citing Scott v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist., 15 N.D. 259, 107 N.W.2d 61
(1906)).




406. 357 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1984).
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determine ownership of a one-half mineral interest in the subject
property. The district court entered judgment for the defendant
grantees, and plaintiff appealed.
40 7
In order to decide this case, the court first construed the legal
effect of a 1970 deed in which Mary Stuss conveyed the subject
property to David and Patricia Kubas by a warranty deed
containing the following reservation: "excepting and reserving
unto the grantor one-half ( ) of all oil, gas and all other minerals
"408 Since it was undisputed that at the time of the conveyance
Mary owned only one-half of the minerals, it was impossible for her
to both convey and reserve one-half of the minerals. 40 9 The result
can be explained by the Duhig doctrine 410 which the court adopted
in Kadrmas v. Sauvageau. 411 Patricia and David Kubas, as grantees,
received Mary's one-half mineral interest, and Mary was estopped
from asserting title to that interest under the reservation clause
because "the warranty obligation is superior to the . . . [grantors']
reservation rights.' '412
The court previously held in Gilbertson v. Charlson41 3 that
grantees who had constructive notice of a five percent mineral
interest in the State of North Dakota and actual notice of a 31 3
percent mineral interest owned by the grantees, could not claim
that the deed conveyed to them the interest that the grantor
reserved. 414 Since "[t]he grantees outstanding fractional mineral
ownership warranted the nonapplication of the Duhig doctrine and
a refusal to estop the grantors from asserting title to the reserved
interest . . . to their cotenant grantee who had actual and
constructive notice of the outstanding mineral ownership."
41 5
In the present case the court distinguished Gilbertson and
limited its application to situations involving facts similar to those
encountered in Gilbertson.416 Therefore, the Gilbertson exception to
the Duhig doctrine does not apply to a Sibert fact situation where the
grantee is without an outstanding mineral interest in the conveyed
407. Sibert v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495, 495 (N.D. 1984).
408. Id. at 496. It is undisputed that the State of North Dakota owns a one-half interest in the
minerals by virtue of a statutory reservation. Id.
409. Id. at 497.
410. Id. at 496 n. 1. The doctrine is that a grantor who, by a warranty deed, purports to convey a
fractional mineral interest is estopped from asserting title to a reserved fractional mineral interest in
contradiction to the interest purportedly conveyed. Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex.
503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
411. 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971),
412. 357 N.W.2d at 497. For a rationale of this result, see 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL
ANO GAS LAW S 311, at 580.10 (1983).
413. 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981).
414. Id.
415. 327 N.W.2d at 498 (citing Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144, 148 (N.D. 1981)).
416. 357 N.W.2d at 497-98.
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property. 41 7 In accordance with this opinion the supreme court
affirmed the judgment of the district court quieting title to the
surface and one-half of the minerals in Kubas.
418
Wehner v. Schroeder
In Wehner v. Schroeder419 Christ and Helen Wehner brought an
action to reform a warranty deed conveying land to Frank and
Barbara Schroeder. 42 0 No mineral reservation was included in
the deed; however, the contract for deed contained language
reserving fifty percent of all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the
Schroeders. 421 Subsequently, the Schroeders conveyed the land to
Eva and John Tormaschy through a warranty deed which
contained no mineral reservation. 422 Eva and John conveyed the
land to their son and his wife, Albert and Genevieve Tormaschy. 423
In the reformation action the Wehners claimed that the language in
the original contract for deed was a mistake and that the intent of
the parties was to allow the Wehners to retain fifty percent of the
mineral rights in the land conveyed. 424 The Wehners also contend-
ed that the mineral reservation was supposed to be made an express
term of the warranty deed but was mistakenly omitted.
425
The matter had been before the North Dakota Supreme Court
the year before when the Wehners appealed the trial court's finding
that the Wehners were barred from recovery by the statute of
limitations and that the deed could not be reformed because
reformation would prejudice Albert and Genevieve's rights as good
faith purchasers. 426 In this earlier appeal the supreme court held
that Albert and Genevieve had constructive notice of a possible
claim by the Wehners because the deed and the contract for deed
were recorded. 427 Further, the court determined that the statute of
limitations did not bar the Wehners' action. 428 The supreme court
remanded for a determination of whether the suit was barred by
417. Id. at 498.
418. Id. at 499.
419. 354 N.W.2d 674 (N.D. 1984).




424. Id. at 675-76.
425. Id. at 676.
426. Id.
427. Id. (citing Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563, 565 (N.D. 1983)).
428. 335 N.W.2d at 567. The court held the statute of limitations did not bar suit because the
action for reformation accrued not at the time of conveyance, but at the time when the mistake was or
should have been known to the party bringing suit. Id.
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laches or estoppel and whether the deed could be reformed on the
basis of mutual mistake.
42 9
On remand the trial court determined that the Wehners'
action was not barred by laches.4 30 Moreover, the trial court
ordered the deed reformed on the grounds of mutual mistakeand
quieted title in the Wehners for fifty percent of the mineral
rights. 43 1 The Tormaschys appealed from these findings and the
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.
432
In discussing the doctrine of laches the North Dakota Supreme
Court remarked that laches does not arise from a lapse in time
alone. 433 Instead, the delay must have caused the party asserting
laches to change his position to a point where he cannot be restored
to his former state. 434 Additionally, a party must have been aware
of his rights before laches can successfully be invoked against
him. 4 35 In reviewing the facts the court agreed with the trial court
that because the Wehners were not aware of the omission and
mistake until 1978, and nothing prejudicial to the defendants'
rights occurred between 1978 and the commencement of the suit,
laches did not bar the Wehners' action. 4
36
The Tormaschys also contended that the Wehners should be
estopped from asserting title in the fifty percent mineral interests.
437
The court dismissed this contention and noted that a party relying
on estoppel must lack all knowledge of the true state of the title and
have no means of acquiring that knowledge.4 38 In this instance,
because the contract and deed were properly recorded, the
Tormaschys had a means of acquiring knowledge concerning the
true state of the title.
43 9
In regard to the Wehners' claim for reformation of the deed
under the doctrine of mutual mistake, the court reviewed the
evidence and found that it adequately supported the trial court's
finding that the written deed did not accurately state what the
parties intended to convey. 44  The Tormaschys asserted that
because the Wehners were negligent in failing to read the deed
before signing it, they should not be allowed to reform the
429. Id.
430. 354 N.W.2d at 676.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 676, 679.
433. Id. at 676-77 (citing Simons v. Tancre, 321 N.W.2d 495, 500 (N.D. 1982)).
434. Id. (citing Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 242 (N.D. 1982)).
435. 354 N.W.2d at 676-77.
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agreement. 44 1 The supreme court agreed with the trial court that
the Wehners' failure to read the deed did not bar reformation
because it was entirely proper for them to rely on the deed since
they were entitled to rely on the product of their attorney.
442
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Cunningham v. Yellowstone Public School District
In Cunningham v. Yellowstone Public School District443 the court
held that Cunningham, principal of an elementary school, was not
a third-party beneficiary of the teachers' employment contracts
and, therefore, affirmed the school board's decision and the district
court's judgment to discharge him as a principal for failure without
justifiable cause to perform his contractual duties. 444 Cunningham
had claimed that the teachers' testimony at his hearing before the
school board should be disregarded because the teachers did not
follow the grievance procedures incorporated into their
employment contracts. 445 The grievance procedures provided that
no formal grievance could be filed with the school board unless the
teachers first discussed the grievances with the principal. 446 The
teachers had bypassed Cunningham and the grievance procedure
because Cunningham was both the subject of the grievance and the
school official responsible to hear the grievance. 447 Cunningham
argued that because he was a third-party beneficiary of the
teachers' employment contract, he could invoke the grievance
procedure.
448
The court held that since he was not the party intended to be
benefited by the grievance procedures in the teachers' contracts, he
was not a third-party beneficiary and the teachers' grievance
procedure could not be invoked. 449 Before a third-party beneficiary
can enforce a contract he must be the party intended to be benefited
by the promise, and at the time of the promise, the promissor must
441. Id.
442. Id. at 679. Justice Pederson wrote a short dissent that referred back to his dissent in the
earlier appeal. Id. Justice Pederson believed that because the Wehners had waited 31 years to bring
suit, they did not have a legal remedy. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Pederson, J.,
dissenting). Pederson concluded that it was a distortion to claim that the Tormaschys had
constructive notice of a mistake that occurred over 30 years ago. Id.
443. 357 N.W.2d 483 (N.D. 1984).
444. Cunningham v. Yellowstone Pub. School Dist., 357 N.W.2d 483, 487 (N.D. 1984).
445. Id. at 486-87.
446. Id. at 486.





have been obligated to the third person so that the third person has
at least an equitable right to the benefits of the promise. 450
TAXATION
Blocker Drilling Canada, Ltd. v. Conrad
In Blocker Drilling Canada, Ltd. v. Conrad 51 out-of-state
corporate drilling contractors sought a declaratory judgment that
original assessments of use tax due on oil drilling rigs brought into
North Dakota were final and irrevocable. 452 Under section 57-40.4-
02.1 of the North Dakota Century Code a tax is imposed on
tangible personal property at the time it is brought into North
Dakota if it was not originally purchased for storage, use, or
consumption in North Dakota. 453 If the property is used the tax is
based on the fair market value of the property at the time it is
brought into North Dakota.
454
At the time the rigs in question were brought into the state the
North Dakota Tax Department had no regulations or written
guidelines pertaining to the fair market value for oil drilling rigs.4 55
Tax consultants, engaged by the taxpayers to handle their use tax
obligations in North Dakota, met with the director of sales and
special taxes, the official responsible for use tax assessment, and
developed a method of assessment to determine the amount of use
tax due and made arrangements for payment of the tax due. 456
After these meetings, the director of sales and special taxes sent the
tax consultants letters on the tax commissioner's letterhead
confirming the meetings and the values upon which the parties had
agreed.457
The North Dakota Tax Department began conducting field
audits on the drilling industry, and based on audit results which
utilized book value rather than fair market value, reassessed the tax
due and imposed penalties and interest .458 The taxpayers argued
that the tax commissioner was estopped from reassessing or
redetermining the use tax or asserting penalties and interest. 459 The
450. Id. (citing O'Connell v. Entertainment Enters., 317 N.W.2d 385, 387 (N.D. 1982)). See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-02-04 (1975) (regarding contract enforcement by a third-party beneficiary).
451. 354 N.W.2d 912 (N.D. 1984).
452. Blocker Drilling Can., Ltd. v. Conrad, 354 N.W.2d 912, 914-15 (N.D. 1984). See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-15 (1983).
453. 354 N.W.2d at 914. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.4-02.1 (1983).





459. Id. at 915.
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North Dakota Tax Department contended that, as a matter of law,
estoppel against the government was not available in North Dakota
as a remedy in tax matters and that the tax commissioner has an
affirmative duty to verify the accuracy of use tax returns and to
assess tax deficiencies when necessary.
460
The supreme court rejected the Tax Department's position
that estoppel against the government is not available as a matter of
law, 461 holding that estoppel against the government is not
absolutely barred as a matter of law, even in matters concerning
taxation. 462 The court emphasized that the doctrine of estoppel is
not one that should be applied freely against the government, but
should be applied on a case-by-case basis. 463 In each case the court
should carefully weigh the inequities that would result if the
doctrine is not applied.4 64 The court should also consider the public
interest at stake and the resulting harm to that interest if the
doctrine is applied.
465
After setting forth the basic elements of estoppe1466 and
applying those elements to the facts of the instant case, the court
was unable to find that the trial court erred in its determination that
the elements of estoppel had been met. 467 The court also added that
to deny that the Tax Department is estopped under these facts
would result in manifest injustice to the taxpayers. 468 The court
reasoned that since revenue collection depends largely upon the
voluntary compliance of the taxpayer, the taxpayer is entitled to
expect fair play from the Tax Department. 469 In applying the test it
set forth, the court stated that the public's interest in revenue
collection in this case was outweighed by the taxpaying public's
interest in being able to rely on 'statements made by the Tax
Department.
470
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization,
471
460. Id.
461. Id. at 919.




466. Id. See Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808, 809 (N.D. 1976).
467. 354 N.W.2d at 920-22.
468. Id. at 922.
469. Id. The court cited with approval the reasoning of a recent Wisconsin case. Id. See
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis. 2d 610, 279 N.W.2d 213 (1979).
470. 354 N.W.2d at 922.
471. 358 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1984).
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Northwest, Republic and Frontier Airlines appealed from a district
court judgment in favor of the state of North Dakota denying the
airlines relief from the Board of Equalization property tax against
them.4 17 2 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed in part and
affirmed in part.
47 3
The airlines contended that federal law prohibiting taxation
discrimination against interstate commerce4 74  preempted
conflicting state law which did not provide airlines with the
personal property exemptions granted other commercial and
industrial personal property in North Dakota.4 75 The supreme
472. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 358 N.W.2d 515, 515 (N.D. 1984).
473. Id. at 518.
474. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d). Section 1513 (d) provides in part:
(d) Acts which unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce,- definitions
(1) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate
commerce and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or
subdivision of a State may not do any of them:
(A) assess air carrier transportation property at a value that has a higher
ratio to the true market value of the air carrier transportation property than the
ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property of the
same type in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of
the other commercial and industrial property;
(B) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; or
(C) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on air carrier transportation
property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and
industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.
(2) In this subsection--
(D) 'commercial and industrial property' means property, other than
transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or
timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a
property tax levy; ....
(3) This subsection shall not apply to any in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for
airport and aeronautical purposes.
Id.
475. 358 N.W.2d at 516. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-27 (1983). Section 57-02-27 provides in
pertinent part:
All property subject to taxation based on the value thereof shall be valued as
follows: ....
3. All commercial, air carrier transportation and railroad property to be valued at
ten percent of assessed value.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-27 (1983)
Section 57-02-08 of the Code provides in pertinent part:
All property described in this section to the extent herein limited shall be exempt
from taxation:. ...
25. All personal property not required by section 4 of article X of the Constitution
of North Dakota to be assessed by the state board of equalization shall become
exempt from assessment and taxation in the year 1970 and such property shall
not be assessed or taxed for that year or for any year thereafter; provided, that
this provision shall not apply to any property that is either subjected to a tax
which is imposed in lieu of ad valorem taxes or to any particular kind or class of
personal property, including mobile homes or house trailers, that is subjected
to a tax imposed pursuant to any other provision of law except as specifically
provided in this subsection.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08(25) (1983).
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court held that federal law prohibits assessing and taxing of airline
personal property while other commercial and industrial personal
property is exempt from taxation. 476 The court concluded that
Congress intended that discriminatory state taxes be prohibited
because of their adverse impact on interstate commerce. 477
The court also noted that North Dakota's personal property
tax on airline property is not an "in lieu" tax within 49 U.S.C 5
1513(d)(3). 478 The court concluded there was no other tax for which
the personal property tax may be called a substitute.4 79
TORTS
Day v. General Motors Corp.
In Day v. General Motors Corp.480 the United States District
Court, pursuant to Rule 47 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate
Procedure, certified three questions of law to the supreme court. 48'
The first question was whether, in a personal injury action based on
the theory of strict liability involving an alleged design defect,
plaintiff's percentage of fault should be applied to reduce or defeat
plaintiff's recovery.48 1 The second question was whether, if
plaintiff's fault is relevant, a court should consider both plaintiff's
accident-producing fault and his injury-enhancing fault. 483 Finally,
the third certified question was whether plaintiff could recover even
though his fault was as great as, or greater than, the defendant's
fault. 484
The Day case involved a personal injury action where the
plaintiff fell asleep at the wheel and lost control of the vehicle.4 85 As
a result Mr. Day was thrown from the vehicle and sustained
injuries rendering him a quadriplegic.4 8 6 Day brought his action
based on theories of negligence and strict liability. 487 Day
contended that his ejection from the car was caused by a defectively
designed door latch.488 He further contended that the defect caused
a significant enhancement of the injuries he sustained.4 8 9 GM
476. 358 N.W.2d at 517.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 518.
479. Id.
480. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984).




485. Id. at 351-52.
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argued that Day's injuries were caused by his own negligence and
that contributory negligence should be considered in a strict
liability claim. 
490
After examining the North Dakota statutes and precedent for
the adoption of comparative negligence 491 and strict liability
claims, 492 the court concluded that a void existed when a plaintiff
had been contributorily negligent in a strict liability claim. 493 The
court then examined case law from other jurisdictions that directly
addressed this issue. 494 That analysis revealed that generally courts
had held that plaintiff's negligence could be considered in strict
liability claims. 495 The rationale for adoption of this rule was that
without it, a manufacturer would be held absolutely liable for any
injuries caused by its product. 496 On this basis the supreme court of
North Dakota held that the comparison of causal negligence or fault
on a pure form basis in strict liability actions would better promote
justice. 497 By "pure form" the court meant that both accident-pro-
ducing fault and injury-enhancing fault would be considered. 498
The court then addressed the final question concerning the
comparative negligence statute, North Dakota Century Code
section 9-10-07, which denied recovery to plaintiffs when their
negligence was as great as, or greater than,- the defendant's
negligence. 499 At issue was whether this absolute bar should apply
in strict liability claims.500 The court, finding no legislation
concerning this subject, concluded that contributory causal
negligence should not bar recovery in strict liability actions even if
the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the defendant's. 50 1 Instead,
the damages would be reduced by the plaintiff's proportion of
fault. 502
Day clarifies some of the issues left open by previous North
Dakota cases involving comparative negligence. In Day the court
concluded that different types of fault, namely negligence and strict
490. Id.
491. N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1975); Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D.
1979).
492. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-05 (Supp. 1983); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d
530 (N.D. 1977);Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974).
493. 345 N.W.2d at 354.
494. Id. at 353-56. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144
Cal.Rptr. 380 (1978); Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 230 Kan. 368, 634 P.2d
1127 (1981); Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1981).
495. 345 N.W.2d at 353-56.
496. Albertson, 230 Kan. 368, 372, 634 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1981).
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liability, could be compared under the comparative negligence
doctrine. 50 3 Further, the court ruled that even though the plaintiff's
fault may be greater than the defendant's fault, the plaintiff is still
entitled to damages in strict liability claims.
50 4
Mauch v. Manufacturer Sales &Service, Inc.
In Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc. 505 Manufacturers
appealed from an order granting the Mauchs a new trial. 50 6 The
Mauchs cross-appealed on three grounds. 50 7 The district court
judge, after considering affidavits of the trial jurors, found the jury
proceedings irregular, impeached the jury's verdict, and ordered a
new trial.50 8 The North Dakota Supreme Court struck the order
and held it improper to take juror affidavits that relate to the
mental processes of jurors in arriving at a decision into
consideration for the purpose of impeaching a verdict .
50 9
On cross-appeal the Mauchs first alleged the district court
judge erred by failing to grant a new trial on the basis that
insufficient evidence existed at trial to support finding Kathleen
Mauch fifty percent negligent in causing her own injuries. 5 10 The
court held that the Mauchs failed to show the jury's verdict to be
manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
511
The Mauchs next alleged that North Dakota's comparative
negligence statute, section 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century
Code, violates federal and state due process and equal protection
rights because a fifty percent negligent plaintiff is denied all
recovery. 512 Applying a rational basis standard of review, the court
held the statute rationally related to the legislative purpose of
tempering the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine.
513
The Mauchs' third contention of error was that the district
court failed to instruct the jury on a strict liability theory of
recovery. 514 The district court had concluded that no distinction
exists between a negligent failure-to-warn theory and a strict
503. Id. at 351, 358.
504. Id.
505. 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
506. Mauch v. Manufacturer Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 341 (N.D. 1984).
507. Id. at 341-42.
508. Id. at 341.
509. Id. at 343 (citing Keyes v. Amundson, 343 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1983); State v. Bergeron, 340
N.W.2d 51 (N.D. 1983); Kerzmann v. Rohweder, 321 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1982); Grenz v. Werre,
129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964)).
510. 345 N.W.2d at 344.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 344-45.
514. Id. at 345.
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products liability theory based on failure to warn. 5 15 The supreme
court found the two theories separate and distinct and held that the
jury should have been instructed accordingly. 516 The court further
held that where assumption of risk and unforseeable misuse are
raised as defenses to a strict liability claim, a pure comparative fault
analysis applies. 517 The case was remanded only for the purpose of
having a jury determine the Mauchs' cause of action under a
products liability theory, the negligence cause of action having been
fully litigated and presented to the jury. 
518
The final issue raised on appeal was whether the district court
erred in denying certain expert witness fees and other costs
requested by Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc. 519 The court
found it unnecessary to reach the merits of this issue because it
found the Mauchs entitled to a new trial on their products liability
cause of action, and thus, costs and fees would be determined anew
by the district court.
520
WITNESSES
In re Thomas Gust
In In re Thomas Gust, 521  Gust appealed an involuntary
treatment order requiring him to undergo treatment other than
hospitalization for a period of ninety days. 522 Gust appealed on the
grounds that the court erred by allowing the petitioner's sole expert
witness to testify by telephone rather than by personal appearance
over Gust's objection. 
523
Gust argued that Rule 43(a) of the North Dakota Rules of
Civil Procedure required a witness to be present in court. 524 The
court, in considering Gust's argument, looked to the language of
section 31-04-04 of the North Dakota Century Code which defines
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 347-48. The contributory negligence principles are not relevant to this type of action.
However, in view of the legislature's acceptance of comparative negligence principles as
demonstrated by its enactment of § 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code, and in following a
course which is most fair and just to the parties, the court held that where an unreasonably
dangerous defect of a product and the plaintiff's assumption of risk or unforeseeable misuse of the
product are concurring proximate causes of the injury suffered, the trier of fact must compare those
concurring causes to determine the respective percentages by which each contributed. Id. at 348.
518. Id. at 349.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. 345 N.W.2d 42 (N.D. 1984).
522. In re Thomas Gust, 345 N.W.2d 42,43 (N.D. 1984).
523. Id. at 43-44.
524. Id. at 44. Rule 43(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent
part that "[i]n all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by statute or these rules." N.D.R. Civ. PRO. 43(a).
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oral examination as being "in the presence of the jury or tribu-
nal. "525 The court also looked to Rule 3.2(c) of the Rules of Court
which limits the instances in which the court will permit oral
argument on motions to be heard by telephonic conference to those
situations in which the consent of all parties is obtained prior to
such oral argument. 52 6 After reviewing these rules, statutes and
definitions, the court determined that "orally in open court"
means that a witness testifying in a case must be present in court so
that the trier of fact may observe the demeanor of the witness;
however, the parties may agree, with court approval, that the
testimony may be presented otherwise.
527
The court determined that North Dakota Century Code
section 31-04-04 must be given full credit in an involuntary
commitment procedure in order to comply with due process
requirements because, although civil in nature, the proceedings
closely track the procedures in criminal matters due to the potential
loss of an individual's liberty. 52 8 Therefore, the court concluded
that witnesses in involuntary commitment proceedings under
chapter 25-03.1 of the North Dakota Century Code must be
present in court to present oral testimony unless all the principal
parties, with the court's approval, agree otherwise. 52 9 After
reversing Gust's involuntary, alternative treatment order the court
stated that the use of preprinted forms to set out findings of fact,
although valuable as a checklist, are not appropriate for findings of
fact or an order and may per se constitute a basis for reversing or




In Hopkins v. McBane53' Antoinette Hopkins appealed from a
district court decision dismissing a wrongful death action.
532
Hopkins had brought the suit as surviving parent of Nelvette
525. 345 N.W.2d at 44. Section 31-04-04 of the North Dakota Century Code defines oral
examination as "an examination in the presence of the jury or tribunal which is to decide the fact or
act upon it, the testimony being heard by the jury or tribunal from the lips of the witness." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 31-04-04 (1976).
526. 345 N.W.2d at 44. Rule 3.2(c) of the Rules of Court provides in part that -[t]he court,
with the consent of all parties affected, may hear oral argument on any motion by telephonic
conference." N.D.R.O.C. 3.2(c).
527. 345 N.W.2d at 44.
528. Id. at 45.
529. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODEch. 25-03.1 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
530. 345 N.W.2d at 46.
531. 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984).
532. Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 863 (N.D. 1984).
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McDonald, a viable fetus whose death and resultant stillbirth was
alleged to be the result of defendant's negligence. 533 The district
court ruled that North Dakota Century Code section 32-21-01 does
not authorize an action to be brought on behalf of a stillborn
child. 534 The sole issue on appeal was whether North Dakota's
wrongful death statute authorizes an action on behalf of a viable
unborn child.531
The supreme court determined that there are two
requirements to maintain a wrongful death action: "(1) a death
caused by conduct which would have entitled the deceased to bring
an action for damages if death had not ensued, and (2) death of a
person. "536 The court had to determine whether a child, if born
alive, could bring an action for prenatal injuries. 537 The supreme
court followed the weight of authority and held that a child who is
born alive has a cause of action for prenatal injuries cause by the
tortious conduct of another. 538 The court next had to determine
whether the stillbirth of a child constitutes the death of a person for
the purposes of North Dakota's wrongful death statute. 539 The
court referred to North Dakota Century Code section 14-10-15 to
determine whether an unborn child was a person for purposes of
the wrongful death statute. 540 The court stated that the purpose of
the section is to ensure and to protect the interests of a child
subsequent to its conception but prior to its birth. 541 The court
determined that it was inconsistent with this section for the trial
court not to confer "person" status upon a stillborn child for
purposes of applying the wrongful death statute. 542 The supreme
court looked to the commonly understood meanings to determine
that an unborn child is a human being that has life prior to the
process of birth and can experience death .
5 43
The supreme court held that North Dakota Century Code
section 32-21-01 authorizes a wrongful death action against one
whose tortious conduct causes the death of a viable unborn child.
54 4
The district court decision was thereby reversed and the case was
remanded for a trial on the merits.
545
533. Id.
534. Id. SeeN.D. CENT CODE § 32-21-01 (Supp. 1983).
535. 359 N.W.2d at 863.
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